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21. Introduction
Since China has experienced exponential economic growth in the last decade, it substantially 
increased its engagement in African states. While this engagement is in the first place economic 
through investments and trade, the political dimension also developed. In opposition to Western 
actors like the European Union (EU), China’s foreign policy approach is based on the principles 
of non-interference and sovereignty. Accordingly, African states receive investments officially 
on a no-strings-attached basis (Holslag & Hoeymissen, 2010; Jing & Barton, 2011). 
The EU, in contrast, emphasizes human security in its Africa policy and attempts to 
promote common normative values. To receive EU development aid and join trade agreements, 
African regimes generally have to fulfill conditions of good governance and democratization. 
The EU, as the biggest development aid donor and major economic trade partner of Africa, sees 
its role and interests undermined by China’s engagement which is especially growing in Sub-
Saharan and oil-rich countries (ibid.).
Recently, African states consider the increasing support from China as an alternative 
development model which is controversially discussed on the international level (Lirong, 2011; 
Jing & Barton, 2011). For example, sub-Saharan countries like Sudan, The Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Angola have increased their exports to China dramatically (Holslag, 2011, p. 5). 
Sudan, torn by civil war, withdrew from agreements with the EU while it substantially enhanced
the diplomatic relations with China (Large, 2009). In other sub-Saharan states such as Nigeria or 
Chad, the picture is more diverse. Despite the pronounced interest of China, investments in these 
states have so far remained small (Holslag, 2011, p.5). Nigerian exports to China have not 
substantially increased (CIA, 2013) and the African state receives major aid donations from the 
EU (European Commission, 2013). However, diplomatic relations between Nigeria and China 
3grew in the last decade. Correspondingly, Nigeria received military training support and supplies
from China (Alden, 2008, p.110, Ogunkola, 2008). Thus, it seems that some African regimes 
clearly opt for the Chinese development model while others are more hesitant and do not want to 
reduce their relations with the West, despite having the opportunity. 
The competition between the EU and China in African states is increasingly evaluated by 
scholars. Thereby, the focus lies primarily on either the EU or China and how their foreign 
policies are influencing the other actor (e.g. Jing & Barton, 2011). However, in how far African 
leaders take part and influence the triangular relationship appears to be a rather neglected aspect. 
This is astonishing, since one would assume that the decisions of leaders of a sovereign state 
make an actual difference. 
Thus, this paper aims at investigating the conflict of interest between the EU and China in 
African states especially with regard to the role of African regimes. The central question is: Why 
do some African leaders opt for the Chinese model in opposition to the EU model and with what 
results? The question refers especially to three different policy areas that are salient in the 
triangular relationship: development aid, trade and security. This thesis compares two cases of 
African states to suggest answers to the research question.  
Research on this topic is of broader relevance for several reasons. Governmental actors
and scholars agree that the triangular relations between EU, China and Africa have become a 
more prominent issue in the last decade (European Parliament, 2008; Brautigam, 2009; Jing & 
Barton, 2011; Holslag, 2011; Lirong, 2011). The foreign policies of all three regions are affected 
by each other. As various examples point out, shifts in the balance of power touch upon policy 
areas of all three actors. 
4Rapidly growing China is particularly interested in maintaining economic relations with 
African states in order to secure its access to raw materials and strategic resources, i.e. oil. 
Similarly, the EU is a prime export destination for African raw materials. In contrast, Africa, 
lacking development in critical areas as well as infrastructure, is an export market for processed 
goods from both parties (Holslag & Hoeymissen, 2010). 
African leaders have to weigh the costs and benefits of leaning more towards the 
development model of the EU or China. With the economic benefit of Western, respectively EU 
development aid come the obligations of political conditionality. Yet, such aid often provides 
substantial relieve in times of conflict and crises, which occur in many sub-Saharan states (Jin & 
Barton, 2011, p.2-6). Moreover, several African regimes see themselves in need of external 
military support to maintain political stability in their countries. A recent example is the African-
led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) on behalf of the Malian government 
against Islamist rebellions, which started in December 2012. The EU is involved through its own 
training mission. It considers the disturbance of the democratic order in Mali as a threat and 
emphasizes that security and development of the country are interconnected (EEAS, 2013).
In contrast, following its leitmotiv of non-interference, China is reluctant to engage 
directly military-wise in African states. It has been known for exporting weapons to African 
regimes. However, China’s contribution to United Nation (UN) peacekeeping troops such as in 
Sudan, since 2006, is rather limited. Such military operations arguably serve the protection of 
investments (Holslag, 2011, p.9-10). Put differently, any political instability can also threaten 
economic interests. This applies for African states as well as for China and the EU. 
Thus, the dimensions of development, trade and security are closely interlinked in the 
foreign policy triangle and should be considered in a case analysis. Recent developments
5demonstrate how the question why African leaders turn to China and with what results is of high 
salience on a global level and of current importance. This makes it worth to investigate further. 
In the growing literature on the triangular relations, the part of African regimes is often 
depicted as passive. This portrayal may be due to difficulties of considering ‘Africa’ as a unitary 
actor in comparison to the EU or China. After all, the African continent comprises diverse
regime types, each with their own agenda.  However, the neglect of African leaders in the 
triangle analyses is regrettable, since they are the ones who are given considerable more scope 
for foreign policy decision making while China’s engagement is growing. To investigate in more 
depth why African leaders opt for the Chinese model and with what results may not only shed 
more light on the conflict of interest between the EU and China. Case studies on this issue could 
also point out scope for cooperation, especially from the African perspective.
In order to answer the research question this paper will firstly review how different scholars 
assessed the issue. Secondly, a methodology and concept chapter will clarify how the research 
question will be approached analytically. Thirdly, a background section will introduce the overall 
role of the EU, China and Africa in the triangle and the policy interaction. Fourthly, the cases of 
Sudan and South Sudan on the one hand and Nigeria on the other hand will be studied and 
compared. The case studies will be structured along the different policy areas of development, 
trade and security. Finally, the conclusion will point out the main findings. 
2. New Choices for African Leaders
This section aims at summarizing the main views in the existing literature connected to the 
research question. It becomes evident that the triangular relations are mainly evaluated with a 
focus on the competition between the EU and China. The interests of the two major actors are 
6often outweighed against each other while African states are pictured as passive actors. Most 
authors devote less analysis to the African perspective. The question why leaders would lean 
more towards either development model is seldom addressed directly. However, in literature 
pieces which either focus on China or the EU and their policy towards Africa one can deduct 
potential reasons. 
To begin with, in China and the European Union in Africa: Partners or Competitors? 
Jing and Barton (2011) refer to China’s exponential growth and its rise as an international actor 
as a “double edged sword” (p.1). This applies especially from a Western perspective. On the one 
hand, China becomes a role model for African development countries. On the other hand, China 
has become a potential rival for developed countries, i.e. EU member states, with regard to their 
political, economic or security interests in Africa. In other words, the EU-China rivalry means a 
rising role model capability of China from the African perspective. Thus, China’s shining 
example could count as one reason why African leaders would opt for the Chinese model. 
Inversely, another potential reason is that, in opposition to China, the EU has partly lost 
credibility among African leaders (Jing & Barton, p.11). This is due to the lack of substantial 
results of the EU development policy. At the same time, the success of Chinese economic 
investments in Africa and several corporations with African regimes have by now exposed 
failure of the EU’s overall normative development policy towards Africa (ibid.).
A quote of the Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade, illustrates this reason further. He 
criticizes the European approach to Africa as slow and sometimes patronizing. Wade refers 
particularly to the post-colonial approach of European investors, donor organizations and 
NGO’s. At the same time, he acknowledges the lesson which can be learned from the Chinese 
model for rapid economic development (Cooke, 2009, p.31). As Cooke summarizes, “China’s 
7economic engagement is regarded by Africans as more pragmatic and in line with African 
priorities” (ibid., p.27). China’s model stands in contrast to obligations imposed by the EU and 
other international organizations, regarding e.g. human rights or economic liberalization (Jing & 
Barton, 2011, p.11).
A further reason for the choice of African leaders seems their priority setting. In the 
contrast of the two development models, the economic dimensions on the one hand and the 
political dimensions on the other hand are pointed out as major aspects. Jin Ling (2010) reviews 
that China stresses co-operation and invests in economic infrastructure by concessional loans, yet 
without political conditions. In opposition, the EU promotes ‘good governance’ and focuses on 
the development of ‘social infrastructure’ in its aid policy. In view of that, the potential priority 
choices for African states are often compared with regard to economic and trade policy. For most 
African countries, the EU still constitutes the main economic trade partner. However, it is 
predicted that China’s closing in on the EU is only a matter of time (Jacobs, 2011, p. 5). China’s 
growing economic presence in competition to the EU makes it possible for African countries to 
hedge more between different partners according to their priorities (Holslag, 2011, p.5). 
Consequently, one can assume that if the Chinese model is matching their preferences, 
African leaders decide accordingly. This can refer to the priorities in development, trade or the 
main concern of stabilizing the regime. Alden (2008) links the choice of priorities of African 
leaders to the political systems in their countries. In a rare attempt to identify a pattern of African 
leaders’ responses to China’s model, the author defines three types of regimes. First, there are 
pariah partnerships, second illiberal regimes and weak democracies and third democracies. 
Additionally, Alden argues that not only the regimes type, but also the nature of the economy of 
the country in question matters. African states with resource based economies tend to be more 
8responsive to the Chinese model. They seem to match mutual interests better than African states 
with diversified economies (pp.105-106). 
There are several examples of Alden’s theory. In countries where African leaders and 
surrounding elites have special control over the state’s resources, “China is a welcome source of 
regime stability, a new strategic partner and a provider of development assistance and foreign 
investment” (ibid., p. 106). This is the case in a range of pariah states. Furthermore, Alden argues 
that illiberal regimes and weak democratic regimes seek to diversify their sources of investment 
with China’s help (ibid., pp. 106; 109-111). The third regime type, democratic African states 
with a diversified economy, value on the one hand the potential strategic partnership with China. 
On the other hand, they may also not opt for the Chinese model because they increasingly face 
China as a local business competition (ibid., p.111, 120-121). To verify Alden’s categorization of 
regime type and political economy, deeper analysis of cases would be needed.  
Another substantial factor influencing preferences for the Chinese or European model 
appears to be security policy. Jing and Barton conclude that overall, the Chinese security 
emphasis on territorial integrity and sovereignty resonates well with most African leaders (2011, 
p.11). Recently, several authors identify a modestly growing tendency of China to engage in 
military missions and the acknowledgement of this by African states. Often, the example of 
China’s contribution to the peacekeeping mission UNAMID in Sudan is given in this context 
(Large, 2009: Holslag, 2011, p.8, Jing & Barton, 2011, p.13). However, authors observe that 
military and security measures by China are overall very restricted and closely tied to the 
protection of economic interest. China also assures that without the invitation of the respective 
country no intervention in any African country would be possible (Hoeymissen, 2011). 
9Two further aspects are salient in the existing literature although they do not particularly
appear as reasons why African leaders would opt for the Chinese model. Firstly, even though
China stresses its no-strings attached policy concerning investments, it also aspires subsequent 
international support from African developing countries. This applies e.g. to blocking resolution 
proposals in United Nations negotiations (Jing & Barton, 2011, p.11-12). The international 
balance of power thus seems to play a certain role. Secondly, it is often concluded, that the 
different approaches of the EU and China are not automatically contradictory. Similar to Lirong 
(2011), Ling (2010) sees potential for cooperation, which means African states would be able to 
receive support from both the EU and China.
As for the results of African leaders opting for the Chinese model, scholars point out 
varied outcomes. This concerns i.e. the neglect of democratization and human rights in African 
countries where leaders have turned to the Chinese model. In the case of Sudan, China’s 
economic engagement and weapon supplies have been blamed for indirectly worsening the 
humanitarian crisis in Darfur (Jing & Barton, 2011, p.12). Sudan and South Sudan still face 
severe development problems together with internal conflict (CIA, 2013). China’s development 
model has been criticized by African multilateral organizations for repeating Africa’s traditional
victimhood in the global political economy of colonialism. Also, African populations suffer from 
ecological damages following the exploration of natural resources (Alden, 2008, p.118-119).
However, the recent experience of some African states with authoritarian governments 
like Ethiopia, Ruanda or Uganda demonstrate, that development is not necessarily linked to 
democratization as favored by the EU. These African countries have improved in the Human 
Development Index without improving in democracy rankings (Fink, 2013). Arguably, this was 
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partly possible due to the option of Chinese support and the role model of economic growth
(ibid.).
All in all, one can draw different conclusion from the existing literature on the triangular 
relation between the EU, China and Africa. A common aspect is that African states are often 
portrayed as passive actors or simply portrayed only marginal (e.g. Lirong 2011; Jing & Barton, 
2011). They are rather pictured as the actors in distress waiting for the EU and China to sort out 
their differences (Varrall, 2012). In a way, this scholarly emphasis reflects the ‘patronizing’ 
critique on the European approach. Accordingly, one could assume from the existing literature 
that African leaders have little influence on whether they can opt for the Chinese development 
model or the EU model.
From another point of view one could also conclude that the roles of African states 
respectively their leaders’ decisions are frequently underestimated in analyses. Accordingly, this 
thesis attempts to fill the gap and presumes that African leaders are actors with considerable
power to decide on a Chinese or a European development model. Although not in depth, several 
reasons why African leaders would opt for the Chinese model are suggested. These reasons 
include China’s rising role model capability; the EU’s loss of credibility; the complex choice of 
different political and economic priorities by African leaders in relation to their type of regime 
and political economy; and security issues of African countries. International balance of power 
and trilateral cooperation are additional aspects. For the results of the leader’s decisions, effects 
on development, democratization and the environment are considerable.
Consequently, from the existing literature, this thesis draws firstly suggestive reasons 
why African leaders would opt for the Chinese model of development and secondly, potential 
results. Together with the theoretical framework outlined below, they help to structure the 
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analytical framework, i.e. the guiding question set applied in the empirical analysis (see annex). 
The subsequent chapter will outline in more depth how the research of this thesis is designed. 
3. Method of Analysis
Rather than testing different hypotheses, the research design of this thesis aims at developing
hypotheses to answer the question why some leaders of African states opt for the Chinese model 
and with what results. To this end, two country cases will be studied comparatively. A case study 
is by definition “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class 
of similar units” (Gerring, 2004, p.342). Thus, the method of structured, focused comparison of 
two countries and their policy interactions with China and the EU should help to understand 
other African states, respectively their leader’s actions. Deducted from the research question, the 
dependent variable in the analysis are the African leaders opting for the Chinese model, while the 
independent variable consists of the reasons for their opting and the results of this choice. Thus, 
the research aims at uncovering such independent variables.
To compare the two cases in detail and investigate potential independent variables, a set 
of general guiding questions was developed (see chapter II, Annex). The questions are in 
accordance with the evaluation of the exiting literature outlined above, the theoretical framework 
outlined below and resulting data requirements. As George and Bennett (2004) put it, these 
questions “reflect the research objective and […] are asked of each case under study to guide and 
standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the 
findings of the cases possible” (2004, p. 67). This method shall assure a structured, focused 
method of evaluation. Overall, it is a rather heuristic and inductive research design. With regard 
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to the case selection, it could be insightful to choose deviant or outliner cases, since their results 
are not necessarily in line with traditional theory (George & Bennett, 2004, p.75). 
This research design bears certain strengths and weaknesses, respectively limitations. On
the one hand, studying particularly extreme cases may help to uncover potential independent 
variables. On the other hand, broader inferences may be limited if the evaluated relations are 
nonlinear.  Also, the range of cases to be studied in this paper is not very broad. Thus, one has to 
be careful not to exaggerate the findings (George & Bennett, 2004, p.75, 84).  Moreover, the 
method can require enormous amounts of information and can be hindered, when data on key 
steps in the investigated timeframe is not accessible. Hence, when hypotheses about the 
independent variables are developed in the empirical analysis, their validity has to be considered 
with regard to these various limitations.
The case studies are selected according various conditions. Firstly, China needs to have a 
potential interest in the country or put differently, the option of the Chinese development model 
must be evident. Secondly, the choice of different country cases should avoid selection bias by 
allowing for some variation in the dependent variable (King et al., 1994, p.129). Thus, the 
countries should vary in their relationship to China and the EU, respectively in their choices 
regarding the Chinese model. 
Sudan and South Sudan are suitable cases because of their natural resources, severe 
conflicts and recent political changes. Sudan and the Darfur conflict, as well as the new state of 
South Sudan are frequently mentioned in relation to China’s increasing engagement in Africa 
(e.g. FES, 2008, p.84). The largest Chinese investments have been in Sudan. Among the Sub-
Saharan states, Sudan is the second biggest oil exporter to China. The Chinese government has 
been internationally criticized for indirectly worsening the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and 
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interfering with the EU approach (Jin & Barton, 2011, p.12). One could presume that South 
Sudan is in need of international partners and models for development, since it only emerged in 
2011. Thus, it can be sufficiently said that Sudan and South Sudan constitute a deviant case.  
Considering that the economic dimension is vital in the conflict of interest between EU 
and China, it would be fitting to also examine a country where the EU is economically more 
invested. Among the Sub-Saharan states, Nigeria is the biggest oil supplier to the EU and the 
largest holder of oil and gas reserves. In the last years, China has also shown interest but 
apparently not gained a strong foothold. There have been Chinese-Nigerian co-operations to 
support the infrastructure and also weapons sales from China to Nigeria (Burgis, 2009; Holslag 
& Hoeymissen, 2010, p. 6). However, it seems that Nigeria has not entirely opted for the Chinese 
model. This makes Nigeria a second case worth studying. 
The analysis is built on a variety of sources. Partly it refers to scholarly qualitative 
analyses. Official government communication from various sides (Sudan, Nigeria, China, EU) 
will be included, too. Bank institutions such as the bank of Sudan and International Monetary 
Fund provide useful data, i.e. on trade. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the 
UN Comtrade database also give detailed overviews. Journalistic articles and reports of NGO’s 
are considered as well, in addition to the UN Human Development Index.
Due to limited means, sources for this thesis are only included insofar as they are 
available in English or German. This surely means a limitation, especially with regard to Chinese 
sources and their perspective on the triangular relationship. Another limitation is evident with 
regard to data. As outlined in the following background sections, ‘development aid’ is in fact 
sometimes a vague term and not distinguishable from other forms of financial support. 
Additionally, data on trade is not at all times up to date or not available for the new country of 
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South Sudan. Weapon supplies and military expenditure remain in both case studies somewhat 
opaque. Nevertheless, the available information can give valid indications on which basis the 
hypotheses on independent variables will be developed. The subsequent section will outline the 
core concepts through which the two case studies will be assessed. 
3.1. The Central Concept of the Chinese and the EU Development Model
This section aims at clarifying central concepts on which the empirical analysis is built. Scholars 
referring to the Chinese model generally imply development foremost through the promotion of 
economic growth (e.g. Jing and Barton, 2011, p. 11). Ramo (2004) coined the term ‘Beijing 
consensus’ for this phenomenon. Accordingly, the Chinese model is marking the way for other 
nations, not only concerning development, but also in finding their independent place in the 
international order (ibid., p.3-6). The Chinese model basically reflects the country’s rising 
development in approximately the last decade. It refers to the economic dimension and moreover 
involves politics, security issues and shifts in the global balance of power (ibid.). Ramo 
emphasizes three theorems in his account of the Beijing consensus: Firstly, the use of innovation 
to reduce frictions which occur through reform, secondly a new working type of chaos 
management by the state and thirdly self-determination which can be used to move hegemonic 
powers, e.g. with regard to security interests (2004, p.11). 
In his attempt to define the Beijing consensus more specifically, Williamson (2012) lists 
five policy pillars. Firstly, it comprises incremental reform and secondly constant innovation and 
experimentation. Thirdly, Williamson stresses export-led growth, since China relied for its
growth on current account surpluses as a source of demand driving the economy. Fourthly, state 
capitalism and market competition are part of the Chinese model, alongside its large state-owned 
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enterprises (SOE’s) which are given advantage. Finally, authoritarianism with an emphasis on 
the collective good over individual well-being and emphasis on national sovereignty build the 
fifth pillar of the Beijing consensus (ibid., p.6-7). 
Ramo points out, that the Chinese path is not entirely repeatable for other countries. 
However, it serves as a role model from the perspective of developing countries, e.g. African 
countries and their leaders (2004, p.5). The model becomes especially feasible since China is 
offering the means to realize it i.e. by investments. Hence, when this thesis refers to African 
leaders ‘opting for the Chinese model’, it implies any of the above mentioned implemented 
measures. However, it connotes especially the deepening of relations to China in different policy 
areas linked to the hope of following the Chinese development.
The branding of the concept ‘Beijing consensus’ as such has been criticized, as well as 
the role model capabilities. Scholars point out that the Chinese growth was partly only possible 
through the exploitation of Chinese labor by foreign countries. Moreover, the model has been 
largely criticized with regard to worrisome domestic consequences in China and abroad. This 
includes the deterioration of income distribution and environmental damages (Williamson, 2012, 
p. 3). Nevertheless, the model is overall considered very successful (Williamson, 2012, p.5).
These different critique points constitute reference points to assess the results of African leaders 
opting for the Chinese model (see annex). 
This thesis sets the Chinese model in opposition to the European model of development. 
The approach of European Union is generally in line with other Western actors, i.e. the US and 
alike oriented international institutions (Jing & Barton, 2011, p.11-12). The US dominated 
approach is referred to as the ‘Washington consensus’ which is often contrasted to the ‘Beijing 
consensus’ (e.g. Jing & Barton, 2011, p.11; Ramo, 2004; Halper, 2010; Williamson, 2002, 
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2012). This contrast mainly refers to different economic market measures implemented by the 
state. 
The concept of the Washington consensus is based on the neo-liberal idea of laissez-faire 
market policy. According to Williamson, it implies “fiscal discipline; changed forms of public 
spending inter alia from indiscriminate subsidies toward health, education, and infrastructure; tax 
reform; financial liberalization; […]; trade liberalization; freeing of FDI inflows; privatization; 
[…]” (2012, p. 13). Important promoters of the Washington consensus are the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which grant 
loans on conditions such as democracy, good governance, decentralization, anti-corruption and 
transparency (Jing & Barton, 2011, p.11). The EU cooperates in its development policy 
especially with these international financial institutions (European Commission, 2012). 
The Beijing consensus contrasted to the Washington consensus mainly portrays the 
competition between China and the US regarding their conflicting approaches to developing 
countries, respectively regions. In the cases of African countries it is reasonable to consider the 
EU as a distinct actor in contrast to China, since it is a major donor of development aid and a 
major trade partner (European Union, 2013). This justifies the focus of this thesis on EU 
development model as an alternative option for African states. 
Based on the officially promoted position of development by the EU, one can argue that 
there is more to its model than the economic dimension emphasized in the Washington 
consensus. The EU as a governmental actor represents a particular normative position in its 
development policy. The stated mission in the field of external aid is to “reduce poverty in the 
world, to ensure sustainable development and to promote democracy, peace and security” 
(European Commission, 2012). In other words, democratization is a central condition in the EU 
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development model, in opposition to the Chinese model. It is closely linked to the EU 
understanding of ‘good governance’, Human Rights and the establishment of the rule of law 
(Jing & Barton, 2011, p. 10-12). 
Another basic assumption of the Washington consensus and the EU development model 
is a positive relation of democracy and growth. This has been proven partly through indirect 
effects of democracy, namely economic freedom, human capital, inflation and political stability 
(Williamson, 2012, p.10-11). Like the Chinese model, also the development model of the EU has 
been object of critique. As mentioned in the review of existing literature, it is sometimes 
regarded as slow and ineffective, patronizing and neo-colonialist (Cooke, 2009). 
All in all, the contrast of the Chinese model and the European model gives certain points of 
reference to interpret whether a developing country turns more towards one or the other and with 
what results. For African leaders, opting for the EU model means more political and economic 
reform than turning to the Chinese model. The two models oppose the different regime types of
democracy and authoritarianism. 
Considering this theoretical framework and moreover the findings in the existing literature, 
the set of guiding questions was generated to be applied to both case studies and compare them 
in a structured, focused way. Accordingly, this set is composed of questions concerning broader 
political and diplomatic relations, different policy areas ‘development and aid’, ‘trade’ and 
‘security’ and aspects of the results of the leaders’ choices. The different segments of the 
empirical analysis will refer to the coded questions (see chapter II, Annex). The following 
section will outline briefly how the different development models are evident on a more practical 
policy level in the triangular relations. 
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4. The Africa-China-EU Triangle
This section serves as a background for the empirical analysis. From a macro-policy perspective, 
it will point out the overall role of firstly Africa, secondly the EU and thirdly China, in the 
foreign policy triangle. It will consider the capacity of each to operate as a unitary actor and the 
resulting interaction. Moreover, general policy approaches and main instruments in the different 
fields of interest between the three regions will be outlined and linked to a brief historical 
retrospect to understand the present status. 
4.1. Africa between China and EU
Africa can only be seen in a limited way as a coherent actor in the foreign policy triangle. As 
Strauss (et al.) puts it: “Since Africa spreads over such a vast geographic scale, contains so many 
different sovereign states, political systems, languages, ethnic groups and historical experiences, 
analysis of ‘Africa’ must lend itself to diversity” (2009, p. 552). It seems difficult to make out 
one common attitude towards the EU, China or the triangular relationship. Bilateral relations are 
more crucial than multilateral, or put differently, the attitude of African states to either region 
varies considerably. This variation is due to the complexity of different regime types and nature 
of economies (Alden, 2008). It may be one reason, why African states and their leaders are 
considered rather less in analyses of the triangle.
Despite China’s overall substantially growing engagement, scholars observe no absolute 
trend of African states turning from a Western, respectively EU model towards the Beijing 
model. Interestingly, the trades focus of the EU and China lies on different African countries 
(Jacobs, 2011). Analyses often cover Northern Africa and the Middle East including Sudan as 
one group of Arabic states and Sub-Saharan states as another group. This also complicates 
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analyses of triangular relations. Consequently, the vast variety of African states underlines the 
need of diverse case studies and points out that results have to be critically evaluated for their 
representativeness.
In spite of its complexity, Africa is considered one geographic region and to a certain 
degree one unit in the foreign policy making of actors such as the European Union or China. 
Both actors follow an overall ‘Africa policy’ (European Commission, 2005-2011; Foreign 
Ministry, 2006). Also on behalf of the African states there are common initiatives with foreign 
policy goals. The African Union (AU) comprises over 50 member states and is thus the biggest 
regional organization. Concerning its partnerships, the African Union aims at “obliterating the 
age-long pattern of donor-recipient relationship, to one founded on reciprocal obligations and 
responsibilities” (African Union, 2012, p.1). 
With regard to the EU, the AU points out the Africa-EU Joint Strategy (JAES) and its 
Action Plans. Achievements in diverse areas such as “peace and security, democratic governance 
and human rights; trade; migration, mobility and employment […]” are acknowledged by the AU 
and considered “most productive” (ibid.,p.1). However, when describing the partnership with 
China, the tone of the AU is considerably more enthusiastic. The China-Africa Cooperation 
Forum (FOCAC) is thereby central. It is named a platform established by China and friendly 
African countries for collective discussion, political dialogue and moreover as an economic 
cooperation mechanism among developing countries (ibid., p.3). According to the AU, the 
FOCAC “is doing very well and has the potential of bringing various advantages to the two 
sides.”  The AU admits need to align the FOCAC better with strategic AU-goals. However, the 
free of charge Chinese construction of the “magnificent” AU headquarter in Addis Ababa, 
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Ethiopia, in 2012 is regarded as “testimony to the real value this partnership brings to Africa” 
(ibid., p.3). 
4.2. The EU and Africa
In contrast to Africa, the EU is a more coherent actor in the triangular relationship. Nevertheless, 
it also represents different member states and thus different interests. Each EU member state 
maintains also bilateral relations with African states. This applies especially to countries with 
former colonial ties such as France or the United Kingdom. Experts observe that member states
tend to leave the issues like good governance to the EU level, which partly leads to double 
standards and incoherence in EU’s Africa policy implementation (Holslag & Hoeymissen, 2010, 
p. 14). Also, member states are cautious to transfer their power to the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security policy, limiting its scope of action. Additionally, on the level of the Union, different 
institutions may also represent slightly different approaches. For example, the European 
Parliament published in the past rather critical statements on the triangular relationship 
development, while the Commission emphasized cooperation (European Parliament, 2008). 
However, there is a common official stance of the EU towards issues in African states. 
This is put into practice by various development programs and trade agreements on the EU level, 
which will be considered in the following case studies. Overall, the EU will be primarily taken 
into account as a unitary actor. 
The EU’s interest in Africa is based on various grounds. Both regions are connected 
historically, i.e. through former colonialism. With the increasing independence of African states 
until the 1960’s new strategies were required. Conventions until 1975 aimed primarily at 
liberalizing trade.  By now, Africa is part of the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) country group
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in the EU’s foreign policy. This group is granted preferential market access. In the course of a
1980’s neo-liberalist wave, the EU relationship to Africa became particularly politically 
conditioned. African states receiving development aid and trade preferences had to manage
resources and political affairs according to the standards of the donor, i.e. good governance and 
democratization. The EU Maastricht Treaty in 1992 changed the emphasis of development 
policy towards more cooperation. Also, security aspects were added as another precondition for 
development (Jing & Barton, 2011, pp.4-6).
Over time, the EU assigned itself a certain responsibility to support and influence Africa. 
The self-image as a normative, democracy advancing power has coined its foreign policy 
(Manners, 2002). Nevertheless, various authors argue that especially Sub-Saharan African states 
lost priority to the EU development policy after the Maastricht Treaty due to the focus on Eastern 
Europe and enlargement. None of the conventions pulled Africa out of political and economic 
despair. Asymmetry has favored the EU economically and politically vis-à-vis Africa. This 
imbalance has arguably undermined mutual relations (Jing & Barton, 2011, p.5-6). 
A cornerstone in the EU’s policy towards Africa is the Cotonou agreement with the ACP 
group, dating from 2000. It defines obligations between EU and ACP countries, such as political 
dialogue, investments via Official Development Assistance (ODA) or the European 
Development Fund (EDF) and trade agreements in line with WTO principles (FES, 2010). It is 
observable that the tone in the EU foreign policy towards Africa changed, when China entered as 
a new variable in the foreign policy (Jing & Barton, 2011, p.5). The rhetoric shifted to mutually 
beneficial relations and equal partnership with African states “beyond the focus of traditional 
development policy” (EEAS, B 2013).  This rhetoric became evident e.g. in the new ‘EU 
strategy for Africa’ in 2005 (European Commission, 2005) and the following ‘Joint Africa-EU 
22
Strategy’ in 2007 (European Commission, 2007) with subsequent Action Plans (EEAS, 2013; 
EU-Africa Partnership, 2013). 
Especially Economic Partnership Agreements with a Free Trade Area potential continue
to be a bone of contention in negotiations between the EU and African states (Lirong, 2011, p. 
11). It is debated in how far African states should lower their tariffs respectively the EU open its 
markets and how beneficial this would be for either side (Oxfam, 2008). Currently, the EU 
continues to be the major aid donor in African states, while Africa remains the major recipient of 
EU Official Development Assistance, in worldwide comparison (European Commission, 2012
B). With regards to trade, Jacobs (2011, p.23) concludes that the 27 EU countries aggregated are 
still much more important than China. This applies in particular to exports from the EU to 
Africa. Next to its member state level, the EU is in 2013 involved as an actor in several security 
missions on the African continent. This includes three ongoing military operations and several 
civilian missions, where executive forces of African states are trained. This is e.g. the case in 
South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Niger (EEAS, 2013 C).
All in all, the course of EU’s foreign policy towards Africa demonstrates various 
interests. Human development is certainly high on the agenda, as is stability for security reasons 
and economic concerns, particularly trade. Europe has preserved a form of leadership in 
opposition to China. It can still be regarded as Africa’s most important external partner. 
However, experts argue that this position is vanishing (Jing & Barton, 2011, p.6).
4.3. China and Africa
Since China represents one country led by an authoritarian government it is easier to consider it a 
unitary actor in its foreign policy. In comparison to Africa and the EU, China is the most 
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coherent party. Yet, even here scholars identify shifting dynamics. For example, Corkin (2011) 
observes that the ministry of Commerce MOFCOM is gaining considerable influence in Chinese 
foreign policy in opposition to other domestic actors. 
China’s diplomatic relations with the African continent date back to the 1950’s. On 
various bilateral levels with African countries, ‘friendship between developing countries’ was 
emphasized. This friendship referred i.e. to mutual political support in the international arena 
such as in the UN. The emphasis switched to ‘partnership’ when China changed from an energy 
exporting country into an energy importing country in the 1990’s. Africa’s strategic importance 
grew for China and particularly economic cooperation opportunities were explored. Since the 
institutionalizing of Chinese-African relations in the FOCAC in the year 2000, Action Plans are 
adopted on a regular basis on summits, respectively ministerial conferences (Jing & Barton, 
2011, p.6-11).
Plans lay out cooperation in various fields, ranging from political affairs; regional peace 
and security; international support; over economic cooperation to cultural and people-to-people 
exchanges. One of the concrete economic cooperation measures is e.g. a provided credit line for 
of 20 billion US Dollar (USD) to African countries with a focus on developing infrastructure, 
manufacturing and small and medium-sized enterprises. Often, ‘common goals of development’ 
are stressed, yet the plans comprise evidently more assistance from China to African states than 
the other way around (FOCAC, 2012). 
An increasing range of mutual high-profile visits between Africa and China, particularly 
in the last decade, underlines growing mutual importance (Jing & Barton, 2011, p.9). China’s 
interest seems to be based in the first place on Africa as a source for natural resources. China has 
diversified its oil imports with over 14 different supplying countries. In 2011, Angola was ranked 
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as the second biggest oil supplier after Saudi Arabia. The ensuing African country is Sudan, yet 
other suppliers such as Iran, Russia or Oman were more vital import partners (US EIA, 2013).
Additionally, Africa means a big and potentially growing export market for China, i.e. for 
machinery, unprocessed materials and textiles (Holslag, 2011; Jacobs, 2011). However, China 
has so far not surpassed the EU as the main economic player. Yet, China outweighs the EU in 
eight African states, e.g. Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola (Jacobs, 2011).
Certain comparisons put China’s increasing engagement in Africa into perspective. In 
opposition to a common public perception, especially on behalf of the EU, Jacobs argues that 
China has so far not overwhelmed Africa. In particular, the Chinese labor services and 
construction business on the continent has growing substantially. Yet, overall Africa constitutes a 
small share of China’s raw material imports and a smaller share of its export market (ibid.). With 
regard to development policy, it is evident that financial assistance to regional African 
organizations is very limited compared to means provided by the EU and the US (Holslag, 2011, 
p.4-5).
Moreover, in line with its emphasis on territorial integrity and national sovereignty, 
China’s involvement in security affairs in Africa has been reluctant in comparison to the EU, 
respectively EU member states. Nevertheless, China has developed into an important contributor
to UN peacekeeping operations (ibid., p.8). It is also a major supplier of light weapons to African 
states (Attree, 2012, p.20). Security challenges in African states have been growing for China 
and brought the country to a crucial juncture. Yet, experts do not observe a turn from China’s 
traditional foreign policy principles (Holslag, 2011, p.9).Furthermore, the country desires a 
bigger role on the international arena and hopes for back-up from developing countries vis-à-vis
Western states. African states have provided such a support on several occasions, e.g. through 
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stopping Western attempts of condemning Chinese Human Rights practices in an UN resolution 
(Jing & Barton, 2011, p. 9).
Finally, in the contrast of the historical relationship between the EU respectively China 
and Africa, is argued that China’s experience as a (semi-) colony gives the country a sense of 
understanding African countries and eventually led to the no strings attached-policy. The EU is 
in a historically more burdened position (Ling, 2010).
Thus, a comparison between the EU’s and China’s overall foreign policy practice 
towards Africa underlines their different models. In their rhetoric, African states welcome 
especially China’s growing engagement and seem to lose interest on the EU’s conditionality. 
With regard to trilateral relations and cooperation, it seems as if especially the EU has to adapt 
its Africa policy to China and is already doing so in the last decade. Observers see little interest 
shown by African countries to foster official trilateral cooperation. Also China seems rather 
passive in this regard. Within the EU, there is a slight controversy. However, the EU seems to be 
the most active of the three to foster trilateral cooperation (Liu Lirong, 2011, p.27-39). In the 
following, the two case studies compare the dynamics in the foreign policy triangle on the level 
of African states. 
5. Case Studies: African leaders between China and the EU
To investigate why African leaders opt for Chinese model and not the EU model of development, 
and with what results, this section will empirically analyze the country cases of firstly Sudan, 
South Sudan and secondly Nigeria. According to the guiding questions (see Chapter II, annex), 
firstly the regime type and recent past of the respective country will be considered, followed by 
its diplomatic relations to China and the EU. Subsequently, the countries’ priorities in different 
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policy fields will be evaluated after one another and set in relation to China and the EU. The 
findings of the first case study will be compared to the findings of the second one.
5.1. The of Case of Sudan and South Sudan
Since the country of South Sudan only emerged in the year 2011 as independent, Sudan and 
South Sudan are broadly treated as one case in this paper. Attention will be paid to the 
establishment of China- respectively EU-relations with the government in Southern Sudan which 
grew increasingly autonomous since 2005.
5.1.1. Sudan, South Sudan and Relations with China and the EU
In the case analysis of Sudan and South Sudan, the political dimension, as referred to in the 
guiding question 2.a., is especially significant since its deeply conflicted past has raised much 
international concern. Sudan suffered from civil war between 1955 and 1972 and from 1983 to 
approximately 2005 (CIA, 2013). After Sudan’s independence from primarily British 
colonialism in 1956, the National Islamic Front (NIF) seized power in 1989 and advocated 
political Islam. Influenced by its colonial heritage, Sudanese governance was deeply marked by
authoritarianism and the belief in cultural superiority of those directing the central state. 
Especially the periphery in the South, West and East was marginalized politically and 
economically by the capital of Kahrtoum, which fostered a series of interlocking violent conflicts
(Large, 2009, p.614). Since 1993, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir is President of Sudan and
head of the National Congress Party (NCP) (CIA, 2013).
In the South, the Sudan’s People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), under the leadership of John 
Garang, styled itself as the representatives of the mainly Christian-animist Southern population 
and its will for independence. The Southern Sudan rebellion spread from 1993 onwards (Large, 
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2009, p.614). In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the 
North and the South, guaranteeing partly autonomy and the option for independence for the 
South. A referendum in 2011 confirmed a vast majority for independence. Subsequently, South 
Sudan was officially acknowledged by the United Nations. SPLA is now the official South 
Sudanese army and Salva Kiir Mayardit is both the head of the state and the government (CIA, 
2013).
The conflicts in Sudan resulted in over two million deaths, four million internally 
displaced people and about half a million refugees (Large, 2009, p.614). The conflict which 
broke out in the Western part of Darfur and the devastating counter-insurgency between 2003 
and 2004 by the Sudanese government led to accusations of genocide (BBC, A, 2011). In 2009, 
the International Criminal Court accused Sudan’s President Al-Bashir of crimes against 
humanity and war crimes on several counts (Large, 2009, p.610). This and other issues remain 
unresolved, despite the CPA and South Sudan’s independence. Not only North and South but 
also other opposing groups fight over oil sharing, border demarcation, national currencies and 
sharing the debt of burden, as well as citizenship (Van der Zwan, 2011, p.9).
Recurring crises and adversarial foreign relations of Sudan are arguably caused by the 
NIF’s revolutionary Islamic politics internally and its expansionist motivations abroad (Large, 
2009, p.614). According to Alden’s typology of regimes (2008), the leaders of Sudan, including 
South Sudan, constitute a pariah partnership, which has “fallen afoul of Western governments” 
and are notoriously criticized for failing human rights and good governance standards. Elites 
control the access to significant resources and enrich themselves while poverty prevails in the 
country. The scope of actions of such pariah partnership is severely restricted by sanctions from 
Western governments with regard to capital raising and security interests (pp.105-106). 
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These issues are also salient in Sudan’s foreign policy making (see guiding question 2.b.). 
Sudan and China have enhanced their diplomatic relations since approximately 1990. From the 
Chinese side, political and material interests in Sudan have particularly increased since then and 
even more when Sudan’s oil resources were discovered at the end of the decade. Large (2009, 
p.613) argues that prior to oil investments, relations to China were more symbolic and had only 
few political consequences. The author also points out a gap between the official narrative of 
harmonious bilateral relations and the more complex reality (Large, 2009, p.611), as evident in 
the further analysis. It is notable that the Sudanese government approached China for support 
during its second civil war. During that time, the US had aimed at containing Sudan 
internationally for links to Islamist terrorist networks. International sanctions were imposed 
against Khartoum. The subsequent deepening of Chinese-Sudanese bilateral relations was less a 
result of political affinity, but matter of circumstances and accidental consequences of the 
Western foreign policy (ibid., p.614-615).
Relations between the countries are maintained on various levels, e.g. between the 
Chinese leaders and the Sudanese corporate political elite. Also, the Chinese Communist Party 
and the NCP co-operate politically. Overall, the Chinese government has developed close 
political ties with the leadership of Sudan. By now, China and Khartoum maintain a “strategic 
and multi-stranded engagement” (ibid. p.611, 616). In the international arena, China protected 
actions of Sudanese government actions, e.g. in Darfur, in the UN Security Council. However, 
Chinese support in the international arena was not as strong as the Sudanese government had 
hoped (Alden, 2008, p.107).
Regarding South Sudan, since approximately 2000, the conflicts and increasing 
independence challenged China’s foreign policy emphasis on sovereignty. The lack of territorial 
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control, especially over Southern Sudan, by the central government in Khartoum meant a threat 
to Chinese economic investments already made, especially in the oil sector. Chinese construction
workers were repeatedly abducted and some were killed by rebellious groups in Southern Sudan 
between the years 2004 and 2012 (EIA, 2013).
Hence, on the one hand, Chinese relations to representatives of the emerging Southern 
regime were handicapped. Beijing interpreted its involvement in Sudan’s internal affairs as non-
interference, while conversely, the SPL Army and movement considered China’s relations to the 
Northern enemy as an intrusion. On the other hand, South Sudan was in considerable need for 
investment. Thus, quasi-diplomatic relations with China were established from 2008 onwards. 
Mutual visits and meetings by high-ranking government representatives, including South 
Sudanese future president Salva Kiir Mayardit and Chinese president Hu Jintao followed. In 
September 2008, a Chinese embassy was inaugurated in the South Sudanese capital Juba. The 
bilateral relations between South Sudan and China thus became official (Large, 2009, p. 620-
623). After South Sudan’s referendum, China was one of the first countries to acknowledge the 
new state (Attree, 2012, p. 18).
All in all, Large (2009, p.612-613) identifies three main narratives from an International 
Relations perspective which explain China’s increased Sudan engagement.  Firstly, from a realist 
perspective, China’s interest in Sudan is due to geostrategic reasons and power politics. This 
interest is mutual. For China, Sudan serves in particular to satisfy energy security and stands in 
confrontation with other actors, i.e. the United States. Secondly, from a constructivist account 
one could observe a normative evolution in Chinese Foreign Policy, which aims more and more 
at constructive engagement in order to end conflict. Thirdly, in a classical liberal explanation, 
often advocated by both regimes, the mutual benefits such as rising trade and economic growth 
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for peace development are emphasized. Especially, the latter explanation goes in accordance 
with the concept of a Chinese development model.
In opposition to Sudan-China relations, the diplomatic to the EU have been much more 
troublesome. The EU approach is determined by the castigatory United Nations actions to Sudan, 
South Sudan and its conflicted development in the last two decades. Since 1994, the EU has 
imposed an arms embargo on Sudan (EU Council, 1994). In 2005, it was merged in accordance 
with UN imposed sanctions. From then onwards, assistance to implement the CPA was allowed. 
The arms embargo, however, was renewed in 2012 and extended to South Sudan (EU Council, 
2011). Certain formal assistance to Sudan by the EU could not be implemented since 
approximately 1990, due to “lack of respect for human rights and democracy” (European 
Commission, 2005 B). Sudan’s leaders withdrew from the Contonou agreement which resulted 
in further sanctions on behalf of the EU (ibid.).
Nevertheless, it is considerable that the government of the Republic of Sudan signed 
together with the European Commission the ‘Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative 
Program’ for 2005 until 2007. Therein, both parties commit to a normalization of their relations
subsequent to the CPA. The Sudanese leadership obliged itself officially to goals such as human 
rights and democratization and welcomes the assistance of the EU (ibid.). Currently, the EU 
officially seeks political dialogue with the new republic of South Sudan and aims at opening an 
EU Delegation in the Southern capital of Juba “as soon as the necessary conditions are fullfilled” 
(EEAS, 2013).
All in all, the Sudan’s as well a South Sudan’s leader maintain more substantial 
diplomatic relations to China than to the EU, respectively EU member states. One can interpret 
this as an unintended outcome of the Western foreign policy. However, it also appears to be the 
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willing choice of the African leaders to turn to China for support in order to consolidate their 
power in their own country. Although there has been rapprochement with the West, including the 
EU, in the last years, adhering to Western demands and sanctions might have meant for the 
Sudanese leaders to lose their authority. This applies especially to Sudanese President Al-Bashir 
who was served an international warrant.
5.1.2. Development Policy 
Referring to guiding question 3.a., the development priorities of Sudan and South Sudan are 
closely connected. Already suffering before its split-up, Sudan is now considered an “extremely 
poor country” (CIA, 2013). The secession of South Sudan meant the loss of approximately three 
fourths of Sudan’s oil production. Given that most of country’s GDP growth was driven by oil 
export since 1999, Sudan is now struggling to maintain economic stability. The secession of 
South Sudan explains a drop in Sudan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) real growth rate in 2011 
to a negative value. In 2010, the real growth rate was estimated 2.2 percent. In 2011, it dropped 
to an estimated value of minus 4.5 percent and even more in 2012, to estimated minus 11.2 
percent. Sudan’s public depth is estimated to be 89.3 percent of the GDP in the year 2012 (CIA, 
2013). Currently, the government is attempting to explore new revenue sources such as gold 
mining. Simultaneously, an austerity program is supposed to decrease expenditures. 
The majority of Sudan’s population (80 percent) is employed in agriculture, respectively 
relies on its subsistence. Despite a new currency, inflation up to 42 percent has spread in the year 
2012. The ongoing conflicts especially in the areas of Southern Kordofan, Darfur and the Blue 
Nile and the lack of infrastructure have severely hampered Sudan’s development. Over half of 
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the population of Sudan lived below the poverty line in the last ten years. Estimations do not 
predict a substantial improvement in the next few years in this regard (ibid.).
The development priorities of South Sudan are naturally closely related. Although most 
of the oil resources are now located in the Sudan, production means and infrastructure are 
deficient. Oil is exported through two pipelines and dependent on the transfer in Port Sudan in 
the North. The potential construction of alternative pipelines in cooperation with other 
neighboring countries would last for years. Moreover, South Sudan remains highly dependent on 
the import of goods from the North. The population’s poverty is as high as in Sudan. State- and 
nation building as well as socio-economic development are hindered by ongoing conflicts 
between different communities over resources (van de Zwan, 2011, p. 14; CIA, 2013). 
Thus, one can broadly summarize the development priorities of Sudan and South 
Sudan’s leaders as very basic social stability and basic economic progress. These include in the 
longer run infrastructure improvement and diversification of the state economies. Both countries 
aim at becoming more independent from one another, but seem dependent on cooperation. The 
subsequent question is, by which means the leaders prefer to achieve these development goals.
Referring to guiding question 3.b., China and the EU and the EU constitute indeed 
different models for Sudan and South Sudan to follow. This is i.e. evident in the multilayered 
development aid and other support the countries received from China and the EU (guiding 
questions 3.c. - 3.f.). Chinese support of Sudan is mostly not clearly classifiable as ‘Official 
Development Aid’. Comprehensive figures of all financial support are difficult to obtain since 
not all information is made publicly available by the Chinese and Sudanese governments. The 
borders between aid, loans and investments by China are blurred. However, a number of 
indicators demonstrate the significance. There are known examples of direct grants given to 
33
Sudan by China. For example, three million US Dollar (USD) were granted to support “North-
South unity” or another three million USD meant to support the elections in 2009 (Attree, 2012, 
p. 23). 
Projects which are implemented by companies from China make most of the contribution 
to economic development in Sudan and South Sudan, next to loans and commercial investments. 
Preferential loans were given to Sudan e.g. in 2006, one amounted to three million USD, to 
rehabilitate infrastructure (Alden, 2008, p. 106-107). Another interest free loan of 13 million 
USD is reported in the year 2007, to build a Sudanese presidential palace. Most loans are tied to 
such certain purposes and more frequent than direct grants (Attree, 2012, p.23). China repeatedly 
cancelled debts of Sudan. This happened reportedly in 2001, which then amounted to 63 percent
of the 67.3 million USD debts, and again in the year 2007, when 70 million USD of debts were 
cancelled (ibid.).
It is estimated that China invested up to 15 billion USD in Sudan. According to an 
advisor of President Al-Bashir, China invested eight billion USD in Sudan in the year 2010 alone
(ibid.). Investments were made in oil refineries, roads, railroads, hydroelectric dams and 
telecommunications. Thousands of Chinese construction workers were brought into Sudan to 
realize the investments plans. Also, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) working 
paper, Sudan is after South Africa estimated to be the largest recipient of Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI’s) in Africa. In 2007, Chinese FDI in Sudan amounted to 800 million USD, 
while eleven years before no FDI’s were reported (IMF, 2011, p.26).
The South Sudanese President Kiir announced in April 2013 the approval of a major loan 
scheme by the Chinese government. It is supposed to be used mainly for infrastructure projects, 
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i.e. the International Airport of Juba and roads. Kiir explicitly stressed the level of cooperation 
between both countries (allAfrica, 2013, B). 
Development support of the European Union to Sudan and South Sudan is structured 
differently from the Chinese support. EU support consists partly of official development 
assistance (ODA) grants. A considerable amount of money is transferred via other policy 
instruments. Sudan did not ratify the first revision of the ACP Cotonou Agreement in 2009 and 
hence lost access to funding from the European Development Fund. According to the Europeaid 
(2013), this meant a loss of 336 million Euro for Sudan. However, the EU took the initiative to 
develop alternative funding to support the vulnerable population of Sudan. This takes place via 
the ‘Instrument for Stability’, the ‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights’ and 
further humanitarian assistance. 
Moreover, in 2010, the EU set up a special fund of 150 million Euros to support 
especially Sudan’s conflicted Eastern and transitional areas. The annual EU action program of 
2011 included project funding for various aims in Sudan, e.g. 23 million Euro for agriculture and 
food security; 12 million euro for education and 12 million for health improvement. This funding 
was enhanced with a special focus on the troubled region of Darfur (Europeaid, 2013).
After South Sudan’s official independence in 2011, the EU also increased its 
development assistance in coordination with the UN. The EU program aims at touching upon all 
areas of the new state through e.g. support in in urban and rural development, improvement of 
infrastructure, health or support in the establishment of justice and the rule of law. Overall, the 
EU’s normative and conditional approach is very much evident in the most recent action plan of 
2011, both for Sudan and South Sudan. It couples in detail ‘crosscutting issues’ such as human 
rights and good governance to the each assistance program, for example to the EU Sudan Food 
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Security Programme (SFSP). Also matters such as environmental sustainability, climate change, 
conflict prevention and gender equality are linked to each program (European Commission, 
2011, p. 6). Development assistance in Sudan and South Sudan amounted to 650 million Euros 
from 2005 until 2010 and humanitarian aid to 776 million Euros from 2003 until 2010 (Attree, 
2012, p.14). Thus, the EU is a major development actor.
The foreign policies of China and the EU in the field of development towards Sudan and 
South Sudan seem to be in line with their different development models outlined earlier. By 
China, Sudan and South Sudan are offered foremost investments, loans and debt cancellations 
with no political strings attached. Nevertheless, the money is tied to certain practical purposes. In 
opposition to this, development funding for Sudan and South Sudan on behalf of the EU is 
coupled with conditionality. The EU’s model includes various measures of market liberalization 
as well as accordance with UN conditions and normative goals. 
Although Chinese engagement is not directly aimed at alleviating poverty, it 
demonstrates considerable capacity to fast-tracking infrastructure development and stimulating
the local economy (Attree, 2012, p.25). Hence, the Chinese development model appears to be 
closer to the development priorities of the Sudanese and South Sudanese leaders than the 
European development model. In this light, opting for the Chinese development models appears 
comprehensible.
5.1.3 Trade Policy
Similar to the development policy, investigating the trade priorities of Sudan and South Sudan is 
bound to certain limitations. Trade data on both countries dating more recent than 2009 and
comparable to other countries is hard to find. On South Sudan, only few statistical reports have 
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been completed so far. The Central Bank of Sudan is reporting on economic data. It provides 
recent, but not always comprehensive data more current than 2009. The UN Comtrade statistics 
are a valuable source, but are hardly complete after the year 2009.
Nevertheless, these various sources can give a fairly representative picture. Referring to 
guiding question 4.a., it is shown clearly that the main export commodity of Sudan and South 
Sudan is oil. In the year 2009, 78.8 percent of Sudan’s exports were composed of mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related products, nearly exclusively crude petroleum oils. As mentioned, South 
Sudan’s secession has complicated oil production and trade. As a result of the two countries 
fights over resources, oil production was shut down in April 2012 (US EIA, 2013). By value, the 
second biggest export commodity group is gold. Other export commodities include food, live 
animals, beverages and tobacco. Sudan also exports small shares of agricultural products such as 
cotton, sesame and livestock (UN Comtrade, 2013). The primary import commodities of Sudan 
are, according to their value, machinery, transport and electronic items, followed by agricultural 
products, i.e. food commodities (ibid.).
Linked to guiding questions 4.b., both the import and export relations of Sudan and South 
Sudan have undergone significant change in the last decade. China has emerged as Sudan’s most 
significant economic partner, aside from being an international ally (Large, 2009, p.614). The 
bilateral trade between Sudan and China increased from 980 million USD in the 2000 to 3.9 
billion in the year 2005 (Alden, 2008, p.107). In the year 2007, total trade has significantly 
grown to 5,7 billion USD. For China, Sudan became the third largest trade partner in Africa
(Large, 2009, p.612).
Inversely, China has become the largest importer of Sudanese exports. According to the 
Central Bank of Sudan, in the year 2009, China was the destination of over 75 percent of 
37
Sudanese exports, for the value of 6,257 million USD. The UN Comtrade statistics accounts a bit 
lower share of exports to China in the same year, namely only 65.3 percent (UN Comtrade, 
2013). The Central Bank of Sudan reports that the value increased in the year 2010 to 8,265 
million USD, while the share of Sudanese exports to China dropped slightly to 72 percent 
(Central Bank of Sudan, 2010, pp.182-186). In 2011, estimated, the share of exports to China 
apparently to dropped further to 65.2 percent in 2011 (CIA, 2013). This is most likely a 
consequence of the Sudanese-South Sudanese split-up. Other major export markets of Sudan are 
the United Arab Emirates and Canada are, with approximately10 percent and 8 percent in the 
year 2009 (UN Comtrade, 2013). 
At the same time, Sudan also increasingly imports from China. Ranked by their share of 
total value, imports from China include machinery and equipment, manufactured goods, 
transport equipment, textiles and chemicals (Central Bank of Sudan, 2012). In 2012, these 
imports from China were worth 1,710,255 million USD. This value of Chinese imports has 
increased since 2009 with 1,926.9 million USD to year 2010 with 2,082.6 million USD.
These significant increases are based on the focus in relations between Sudan and China 
on facilitating economic agreements or as Large (2009) puts it an “economic-in command model 
spearheaded by oil-investments” (p.615). Indeed, through China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) International Sudan, China holds the largest stakes in Sudan’s two major oil 
consortiums. These are the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company and Petrodar. Their
production centers are located at the partly disputed North South border and in South Sudan. 
(ibid., pp. 612-615). 
Consequently, trade of Sudan has clearly changed in favor of China in the last decade, in 
opposition to any other actors, such as the EU. However, the outlined trade data illustrates that 
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economic relations between Sudan and China are very asymmetrical. China is much more 
important to Sudan than the other way around (ibid., p.616). This imbalance in the Chinese-
Sudanese respectively Chinese-South-Sudanese trade relations is also evident in other aspects. 
One example is the drawing on loans of Sudan. In total, Sudan drew 570,8 million USD on loans 
abroad. Of this, 214,5 million USD were drawn from China. The major share of these loans was 
invested in infrastructure projects, i.e. for electricity and power transmission (Central Bank of 
Sudan, 2010). 
Another example underlining the severe asymmetry in the trade relationship is how 
ongoing conflicts disturb economic relations. Sudan and South Sudan grew to be significant 
contributors to China’s oil imports, until the oil production was shut down in the beginning of 
2012. Exports fell down from 260,000 barrels a day in the year 2011 to zero in April 2012. 
Subsequently, China substituted the lost shares of oil with imports from other countries 
worldwide (US EIA, 2013). Such incidents also demonstrate how China’s non-interference 
policy may impede in practice with the protection of its economic investments. 
Sudan’s and South Sudan’s trade with the EU is a short story in comparison to China. 
Sudan has been subject to the sanctions and embargos in the last two decades, as mentioned 
afore. Currently, the EU is officially committed to cooperation with Sudan and also South Sudan 
on trade matters. The EU pursues duty-free and quota access to EU markets “as soon as 
conditions are met” (European Commission, 2012). Yet, Sudan has been reluctant to engage in 
the ACP group and avoided liberalizing its markets. Resources are state-controlled. In contrast to 
Sudan, South Sudan has requested to join the Cotonou agreement in March 2012 and is expected 
to take part in this treaty (EEAS, 2013, C). Nevertheless, trade relations are not entirely in hold. 
To the EU, Sudan exported in the year 2009 worth 45.4 million USD and in 2010 for the value of 
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84 million USD. This meant an increase from 0.5 percent to 0.7 percent of total exports to the 
EU. Imports to Sudan from the EU are mainly coming from Germany (UN Comtrade, 2013).
All in all, it is evident from the trade policy area how vastly Sudan and South Sudan 
leaders rely on China. China is the main export and import partner for both countries. From the 
Sudanese perspective, the dramatic increase in trade relations and resulting opportunities for 
capital raising are clearly reasons to opt for the Chinese development model. The gap to trade 
relations in comparison to the European Union is huge. For Sudan and South Sudan, the EU 
ranks in trade importance far behind China. Other countries such as the United Arab Emirates or 
Canada have far stronger trade relations to Sudan and South Sudan.
Taking into account also the development policy area, it becomes obvious that Sudan’s 
and South Sudan foreign relations concentrate on China, but are nevertheless multilayered. Many 
loans are taken from funds of the Middle East respectively Arab region. Relations to India are 
also maintained. For both Sudan and South Sudan, the European Union seems to rank in 
importance only after these various actors. The EU model of development is with regard to trade 
not appealing to the Sudanese leaders, since it would mean considerable concessions. 
Nevertheless, in the case of South Sudan, one can observe growing potential in trade relations 
with the EU.
5.1.4. Security Issues
With regard to guiding question 5.a. priorities in the security policies of Sudan and South Sudan 
are logically closely related to the decades of civil war, in particular between the Northern and 
Southern part. The ongoing conflicts, especially but not only in border regions constitute a threat 
to the authority of both regimes and endanger their civilian population. A potential spillover of 
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the Arab Spring movement in Sudan’s neighboring countries Lybia and Egypt from 2010 
onwards amounted to an additional challenge, during which the regime of Sudan mainly focused 
on its survival. Al-Bashir announced in 2012 not to run again for presidential elections in the 
year 2015, which was interpreted as evidence for growing tensions within the ruling party
(Freedom House, 2013)
Popular unrest and sporadic protest against economic austerity programs of the central 
government in Sudan in the beginning of 2012 were answered with brutal crackdowns and mass 
arrests. The military is strongly represented in the regime and involved in vital functions of the 
state. The Darfur area remains a continuous area of conflict and security concerns of the 
government. Rebel groups refused various peace agreements and settlements. Fighting increased 
again in 2011 (ibid.). In May 2013, Al-Bashir announced a new Regional Security Commission 
for Darfur to act ‘without prejudice’ with the goals of solving ongoing conflicts (allAfrica, 2013, 
A). 
Rebellious groups both in the North and South, as well as the SPLA of South Sudan are 
internationally criticized for continuous deployment of child soldiers (Freedom House, 2013).
Moreover, the SPLA frequently takes over police tasks in South Sudan and is according to 
Human Rights organizations accused of severe abuses while doing so. Accusations refer to 
killings, home destruction and prowling. Hundreds of civilians were still killed in 2011 in fights 
between the SPLA and rebel groups (ibid.,B). Thus, the security priorities of the Sudanese and 
South Sudanese leaders range from regime survival to basic stability and suppression of internal 
conflicts. It appears that sustainable peace is still not within reach of both countries. 
Referring to guiding question 5.b.-5.d. to improve the security situation in their countries, 
both Sudan and South Sudan allow for international military support missions to which in in turn 
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EU member states and China contribute. In 2013, the UN peacekeeping missions UNAMID in 
Darfur and UNISFA in the disputed border region of Abyei Area are running in Sudan. 
UNAMID is the largest one thereof. The mission’s military and police personal are among other 
countries, supported by staff from China and Germany as the only EU member state (United 
Nations, 2013). 
However, the Sudanese government is only limitedly willing to cooperate internationally. 
After the UN mission UNMIS expired in July 2011, the Sudanese government rejected a new 
UN mandate. The mission ran for six years and involved Chinese military and personal, as well 
as personal from ten EU member states (ibid.). Overall, the scope for NGO’s is limited in Sudan, 
since movements of peacekeeping troops and aid workers are restricted by government forces 
and rebel groups alike (Freedom House, 2013). In South Sudan, the UN mission UNMISS is 
running since 2011. South Sudan is highly dependent on the assistance of foreign NGO’s, which 
operate fairly free in the country (ibid.). To UNMISS, China contributes to military personal, 
next to eight EU member states. China also contributes police personal, like three EU member 
states do (United Nations, 2013).
Apart from its member states deployment of civilian and military personal, the EU 
supported the African Union’s mission AMIS from 2004 until 2007 in Darfur, with military and 
police experts. This AU mission was handed over to the joined UN-AU mission UNAMID. The 
EU’s financial commitments amounted to over 500 million Euros (European Council, 2012). 
Additionally, the EU started the civilian EU AVSEC mission in South Sudan in 2012, which 
aims at strengthening security at Juba international airport. The mission followed an invitation of 
the South Sudanese government and is described as part of the ‘comprehensive approach’ of the
EU towards South Sudan (EEAS, 2013, C). 
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An additional aspect to consider in the field of security between China and the EU is 
arms supply, linked to guiding questions 5.d and e.. The Sudanese and South Sudanese 
leadership is in need of weaponry to enforce their security policy,. The arms manufacturing and 
arms supplies of both statess are somewhat opaque which limits research possibilities. However, 
incomplete figures serve as an indication. According to security research by SIPRI (2013), there 
was a considerable increase in Sudan’s military expenditures from the year 1998, with 695 
million USD, to the year 1999, with 1245 million USD. By 2006, military expenditures had 
significantly more increased to 2296 million USD. Unfortunately, numbers from 2007 onwards 
are not available for Sudan. South Sudan increased its military expenditures notably from 736 
million USD (in 2010) to 1047 million USD in 2011, its year of independence. 
In the timeframe from 1998 to 2012, Sudan’s by far largest weapon suppliers were Russia 
(total of 920 million USD), China (185 million USD), Ukraine and Belarus (181 and 123 million 
USD). According to the obtainable figures, arms exports from China to Sudan were at their peak 
in the year 2003, with a total value of 97 million USD. In addition, the Small Arms Survey 
accounts on the basis of UN Comtrade data that China delivered from the year 2001 until 2008 
around 72 percent of primary small arms and light weapons to Sudan (Small Arms Survey, 2009, 
p.3). Concerning South Sudan, the only two listed weapon suppliers from 2007 onwards are 
Russia and Ukraine. According to the available figures they supplied until 2009 all together 
weapons for the value of 143 million USD. China is not listed as a weapon supplier to South 
Sudan (SIPRI, 2013, B).  
The bare supply of weapons is not the only indication. It is suspected, that China 
supported the building of arms factories in Sudan’s capital Khartoum in the late 1990’s (Large, 
2009, p.617). Among other sources (e.g. BBC, 2012), Attree (2012) argues that overall, China 
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substantially supported the flow of arms resources and military expenditures of the Sudanese 
government. This includes not only the arms sales but the fact that oil revenues achieved were 
largely used to finance the increasing military expenditures, which China could have expected
(p. 21). 
In opposition to Sudan’s relation to China, relations to the EU with regard to weapon 
supplies are again part of the Western approach. EU and other international sanctions in place 
restrict any weapon sales from the EU to Sudan. In 2013, the arms embargo on Sudan and South 
Sudan is maintained (European Commission, 2012).
Overall, the analysis of the security policy of Sudan exposes once more how the 
country’s leaders turn to China to accomplish their goals. While they allow to a certain extent for 
international help to achieve basic stability, the assurance of the Sudanese regime is based on 
oppression through military resources which in turn depends on supplies from abroad. As far as 
known, China played a substantial role in providing these military resources for more than the
last decade. With the fostering of diplomatic, development and trade relations between Sudan 
and China, deals on weapon supplies are a subsequent step from which both sides seem to profit 
in the first place. In contrast, the EU is a limited valuable partner to the Sudanese leaders in the 
field of security, since it does not directly support the regime, respectively boycotts it with 
embargos. Again, South Sudan seems to develop a different stance and seeks more cooperation 
with the EU.
Consequentially, from the perspective of Sudan’s regime the field of security policy 
constitutes another reason, to opt for the Chinese model of development. Inversely, it is 
questionable how beneficial the path of military oppression is for the Sudanese leadership as well 
as China, especially in the long run. Especially the Sudanese population is suffering under the 
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brutal approach of the central government. The following section assesses several consequences 
of the Sudanese leaders opting for the Chinese model.
5.1.5. Results of the Choices: Sudan and South Sudan between China and the EU
This section aims at evaluating the eventual results of Sudan and South Sudan opting for the 
Chinese in opposition to the EU model. It will assess broadly the overall development the 
African states through different measurements such as the Human Development Index and the 
Freedom House Index. It will be considered in how far these developments can be regarded as a 
result of African states opting for the Chinese development model in opposition to the EU model.
As an alternative measure to GDP growth, the Human Development Index (HDI) takes
into account health, education and living standards (guiding question 6.a.). These are in turn built
on data of the four indicators life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, and gross 
national income per capita. In the year 2000, Sudan had an overall HDI value of 0.364. In the 
year 2012, the overall HDI value of Sudan had increased to 0.414. Counting from the year 1980 
(HDI 0.269) onwards, Sudan has increased its HDI value yearly by 1.4 percent and overall by 54 
percent. Put into comparison, Sudan’s 2012 HDI value of 0.414 is below the average of 0.466 for 
countries in the low human development group. Worldwide, Sudan is ranked 171 out of 183 
(Human Development, 2013).
Two of the three HDI components increased in the about the last decade. Life expectancy 
at birth in Sudan rose from 57 years in the year 2000 up to 61.8 in 2012. The Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita is measured in USD purchasing power parity. It increased from 1,274 in 
2000 to 2,136 in the year 2011. In 2012, the GNI per capita dropped to 1,848; assuming this is 
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due to the secession of South Sudan. The expected years of schooling in Sudan stayed the same 
since the year 2000 with 4.5 years. So far, there is no HDI collected for South Sudan (ibid.).
In how far the HDI can be seen as a result of the African leaders opting for the Chinese 
model of development is debatable. It seems at least safe to conclude that Chinese engagement in 
Sudan did not worsen the overall human development of Sudan and South Sudan in comparison 
to before. However, the dramatic increase in trade relations seems to have comparatively little 
direct effect on the human development.
Since the development model of China and the EU place different importance on 
democracy, the scoring of African states in the Freedom House Index in the last years is an 
additional valuable indicator (see guiding question 6.b.). The US-based ‘watchdog organization’ 
is comparatively assessing global civil liberties, political rights linked to improvements and 
setbacks in democracy (Freedom House, 2013). China itself is considered a country which is not 
free, in contrast to EU member states. Every country is rated numerically on a scale from 1 (free) 
to 7 (not free). 
From 1999 until 2012, Sudan maintained the same status as ‘not free’ and scored
continuously 7 in the freedom rating, civil liberties and political rights. Trends do not forecast 
soon improvements. This is due to various issues such as arrests of political opposition activists, 
prohibition of a leading political party, brutal reaction to public demonstrations in e.g. Khartoum 
and suppression of journalists’ work by the Sudanese government (Freedom House, 2013). 
Accordingly, Sudan is not ranked as an electoral democracy. The multiparty election in 
the year 2010 did not meet international standards, as observers from the US, the EU and Sudan 
itself noted. The dominance of the ruling party NCP’s was reinforced by South Sudan’s 
secession. Corruption levels are by guess among the highest in the world. The marginalization of 
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the areas outside Khartoum has not substantially changed. NCP elites continue to sway power 
over resources, e.g. in business and banking. The revenues frequently help to pay for political 
support. Party elites are estimated to own the majority of companies which are favored in 
government contracts (Freedom House, 2013).  
South Sudan was only ranked in 2012 by Freedom House and is as well depicted as ‘not 
free’. Yet, its scores in the overall rating with 5.5 are better than in Sudan. Also civil liberties (5) 
and political liberties (6) are judged to be better. This is partly due to a legal vacuum, in which 
e.g. journalists are operating. For many areas, the government is still planning to pass bills. The 
first elections of South Sudan are planned for the year 2015. In the meantime, the state is 
governed by the winners of the 2010 elections. The state system is also criticized for serious 
corruption, the advantage taking and inadequate diversion of public funds and the preferential 
treatment of SPLM loyalists (Freedom House, 2013). 
With regard to Sudan’s severely conflicted past and present, the critical freedom ranking 
is not surprising. Civil liberties are not on the priority agenda of the Sudanese leadership, 
especially not when they may arguably threaten the regime’s survival and other security policy 
priorities. One can assume that the substantially enhanced relations of Sudan to China did not 
have an improving effect on the development of civil liberties and democratization, since it 
stabilized the oppressive regime. The case of South Sudan, who had suffered from oppression by 
the North, appears to be slightly different again. It seems as if civil liberties have a higher 
standing with the leaders, although that remains to be seen in the longer run.
As for the environmental consequences (guiding question 6.c.), of Sudan opting 
for the Chinese model, there are no encompassing evaluations available so far. Reports by 
international media hint that oil exploration both in Sudan and South Sudan caused serious 
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environmental damage. Toxic chemicals used in the exploration process pollute water and land 
and endanger lives of the population and harm cattle and agricultural production, which is vital 
for people’s subsistence (Attree , 2012, p.34-35). One can assume that concerns in this regard are 
not a priority of the leadership of Sudan, South Sudan nor China. 
All in all, one can interpret the leaders’ decisions in the case of Sudan and South Sudan 
as opting for the Chinese model of development in several regards. The significant turn to China
is evident in the diplomatic relations, the development policy as well as trade. Sudan has 
additionally relied heavily in its security policy on China. In the latter field, South Sudan seems 
to follow a different path towards more international cooperation, including the EU. The Chinese 
multi-stranded engagement and the significantly fast establishment of trade relations to both 
Sudan and South Sudan have considerable potential to boost the economy and development. 
They appear to be the crucial reason why the Sudanese and South Sudanese leader turned to 
China. Moreover, considering the indicative weapon supplies, the relations to China considerably 
helped to secure the power of the Sudanese government and are thus another reason.
Referring to the central concept’s elements of the Chinese model of development, export-
led growth, authoritarianism and self-determination are certainly visible in the Sudanese leader’s 
policy. As supposed in the existing literature on the topic, it has been arguably a question of 
priorities of the regime to decide for the Chinese model in opposition to the EU model. The 
stance in the EU development model with a normative emphasis on democratic development and 
is not conforming to Sudanese or South Sudanese priorities. Neither seems the liberalization of 
its markets appealing for Sudanese regime. Again, South Sudan may develop differently in this 
regard. 
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However, so far one can question the success of the implementation of the Chinese model 
in Sudan and South Sudan. As pointed out in the results evaluation, both Sudan and South Sudan 
continue to be unstable. They show only slow progress in their overall development and are 
heavily dependent on China. From the normative perspective of the EU it is regrettable that the 
population in both Sudan and South Sudan does not seem to profit much from its leaders’ 
choices. People suffer from brutality of the military, oppression of civil liberties and 
environmental damage caused by oil exploration. Yet, one has to note that neither Sudan nor 
South Sudan entirely rejected the EU as a helping hand. Development aid and structural support 
was accepted, not only but partly under the leadership of the United Nations. Realistically 
speaking, neither Sudan’s nor South Sudan’s leaders seem to consider themselves in a position to 
entirely deny international help. Thus, even in extreme cases such as the Sudan, opting for the 
Chinese model does not necessarily imply rejection of the EU model and trilateral cooperation 
seems possible. The following section will compare these findings of the case of Sudan and 
South Sudan to another African state, Nigeria. 
5. 2. The Case of Nigeria
The Nigerian case differs in several regards from the first case. This chapter analyzes the African 
state in the same manner with regard to various policy fields and points out similarities and 
differences in relation to China and the EU. 
5.2.1. Nigeria’s Relations with China and the EU
Referring to guiding question 2.a., similar to Sudan, the independence of Nigeria in 1960 from 
British colonial rule constitutes a milestone in the country’s past. Subsequently, Nigeria’s state 
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system was coined by military coups and roughly 16 years of military rule. A transition to a 
civilian government was accomplished in 1999. The country’s regime was facing the task of 
institutionalizing democracy and moreover developing the petroleum-based economy, which was 
disrupted by corruption and mismanagement. Though not as grave as in Sudan, ethnic and 
religious tensions continue within the population. Comparable to Sudan, cleavages remain e.g. 
between Muslim and Christian and Northern and Southern groupings. Nigerian elections after 
1999 were repeatedly disturbed by violent riots, although international observers see an overall 
improvement since 2007. The current head of government and the chief of state of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan, is member of the People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP) (CIA, 2013). The party retained its power last in the elections in April 2011. 
Subsequently, riots occurred especially in the North, where estimated 800 people died and 
65,000 people were displaced (Freedom House, 2013). 
In 2013, Nigeria is considered a weak democracy. The country’s elites have considerable 
privileged access to resources and revenues, though not as profoundly as in Sudan and South 
Sudan (Alden, 2008, p.110). As in Sudan and South Sudan, the country’s revenues mainly 
originate from the oil sector. Nigeria is ranked number 12 on the world’s top world oil producers 
in 2011 and the largest one in Africa (US EIS, 2013, B). Being additionally Africa’s most 
populous state, Nigeria owns a prominent political role on the continent. Its influence becomes 
manifest in regional organizations like the AU (Alden, 2008, p.110). Thus, despite flaws, Nigeria 
is a politically a more stable and self-sufficient country than Sudan and South Sudan. 
Relating to guiding question 2.b., the diplomatic relations between Nigeria and China 
have significantly increased over the last decade, although not as substantially as in the case of 
Sudan and South Sudan. Nigeria, too, is considered a ‘strategic partner’ by the Chinese. From 
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Nigeria’s viewpoint, China is a potential supporter for the Nigerian bid for a UN Security 
Council seat. Mutual visits of high-profile politicians, including former Chinese leader Hu 
Jintao, underline the explicitly expressed interest in each other (Alden, 2008, p.110). As 
Nigeria’s representation to China puts it: “Bilateral relations have witnessed momentum of rapid 
development with frequent exchanges at all levels and mutual political trust and bilateral 
economic benefits at hundreds of billions of dollars” (Nigerian Embassy Beijing, 2013). 
At the same time, in opposition to Sudan, Nigeria’s relations to the EU have deepened
over the last decade. Generally, negotiations are taking place in the framework of the Cotonou
agreement. This entails Nigeria’s access to various EU development funding instruments, which 
Sudan and South Sudan do not have in this scope. Nigeria and the EU agreed in 2009 to deepen 
bilateral dialogue and cooperation in a detailed framework. Moreover, substantial trade relations 
are a priority. Regularly, both sides meet to deliberate and pass communiqués on human rights 
issues, security and migration. The EU acknowledges the commitments the Nigerian government 
is making with regard to democratization (EEAS, 2013, D).
Overall, Nigeria’s diplomatic relations to both China and the EU appear much more 
stable and outbalanced than in the case of Sudan and South Sudan. Like in the case of Sudan, 
international balance of power and issues at the UN level play a role.   
5.2.2. Development Policy
Regarding guiding question 3.a., Nigeria’s government acknowledges various fields of the state 
where substantial development is required and officially sets its priorities accordingly. However, 
Nigeria’s own regimes states that the UN Millenium Development Goals such as substantially 
alleviating poverty are unlikely to be met soon. This is argued due to a lack of policy 
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coordination between different government levels and reluctant funding commitments. 
Moreover, staff to carry out projects to improve education, health and poverty levels is missing
(Federal Ministry, 2013). 
Another problem is the country’s infrastructure, which is insufficient and as well as a 
poor regulatory environment. Before major reform initiatives in 2008, political instability and 
poor macroeconomic management were endemic (CIA, 2013). The ‘unhealthy dependency’ of 
Nigeria’s economy on the oil sector is recognized by the government as a major problem. 
Additionally, this main sector is plagued by substantial problems in the oil producing Niger-
Delta region. It refers to disturbed corporate relations with indigenous communities, vandalism 
of oil infrastructure, personal security problems and grave ecological damages. A special 
Commission was set up to tackle economic and social development. Yet it is criticized by own 
the central government as “ineffective and opaque” (Federal Ministry, 2013). 
Accordingly, one major priority of the government is to diversify the economy. The 
agricultural sector is among others currently in the focus of the leader’s development policy.
Despite the defects, similar to Sudan, two thirds of Nigeria’s population is employed in this 
sector, which accounts for approximately 40 percent of its GDP. Years of mismanagement and 
inconsistent government policies in agriculture are to be amended. Moreover, the large ‘informal 
economy’ is to be reduced (ibid.).
To achieve improvement, an initiative of President Jonathan set up an internationally 
acknowledged economic team to increase transparency and improve fiscal supervision (CIA, 
2013). Especially with the help of foreign investment, Nigeria’s leadership aims at expanding as 
a regional and international market actor. Reform programs seek to establish niche markets 
outside the sector of energy, i.e. telecommunication and explore the large national market better. 
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To attract foreign investment, Nigeria’s leadership officially commits itself to improve the 
security situation for life and property, rebuild and maintain infrastructure and notably sustain 
democratic principles (Federal Ministry, 2013). A fairly strong growth in Nigeria’s GDP from 
2007 until 2012 grants reform attempts a certain success, although this is underpinned by robust 
global oil prices. Overall, real GDP growth has slightly declined from 8 percent in 2010, over 7.4 
per percent in 2011 to 7.1 percent in 2012 (CIA, 2013).
Hence, the overall development situation of Nigeria is better than in Sudan and South 
Sudan. Nigeria’s democratic government appears more open in recognizing problems and tackles
its development priorities publicly. Since the development status of Nigeria is more advanced 
than Sudan’s and South Sudan’s, its priorities are similar but more progressive. Nigeria’s focus 
lies on diversifying the economy, attracting foreign investment by providing better security 
conditions and infrastructure. 
Referring to guiding question 3.b., the development models of the EU respectively China 
for Nigeria each include their general conditions and principles described earlier. On the one 
hand, according to the EU, peace and security; governance and human rights; trade and regional 
integration have priority, next to several key development issues such as climate change and 
health (EEAS, 2013, D). This becomes more specific when considering the various financial 
supports Nigeria is receiving.  In the timeframe of the bilaterally agreed country strategy paper 
from 2009 until 2013, the country is expected to acquire approximately 700 million Euros. This 
money is primarily obtained from the EDF. The EU states that at least 200 million Euros are 
intended to solve increasing security problems within Nigeria (ibid.). 
On the other hand, China has invested considerably in the Nigerian oil sector and follows 
a no political strings attached-policy. One example is the 2 billion US Dollar investments by 
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CNPC into an oil refinery in Northern Nigeria. Moreover, China committed itself to one billion 
USD in Nigerian infrastructure projects. More investments from China were made in the cotton, 
palm oil and timber production and furthermore telecommunications sector (Alden, 2008, p.110). 
As in the cases of Sudan and South Sudan, China has sent construction workers to Nigeria, e.g. 
to set up power plants. These agreements were made on a loan basis, like several other projects 
e.g. a railway, aviation works and roads (Reuters, 2013). However, the scope of Chinese 
investments is so far not as huge as in Sudan and South Sudan. 
Thus, one can assume that Nigeria is turning increasingly to China in its development 
policy, but at the same time not evidently less to the EU. By apparently adhering to conditions of 
the EU development model and striving for Chinese investments, Nigeria seems to aim for both 
sides. A reason for Nigeria to opt for the Chinese model is evidently the significant investments 
directly received for various purposes. They are serving the broader goal of diversifying the 
economy and improving the infrastructure. 
5.2.3. Trade Policy
Considering guiding question 4.a., similar to Sudan and South Sudan, Nigeria’s main export 
product is oil and oil related commodities. In 2010, mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials, largely crude petroleum oils, made for 87.1 percent of Nigeria's exports. Also natural
gas is increasingly exploited and exported. The country increased its exports on average by 10 
percent between 2006 and 2010. At the same time, imports were on the rise, with on average 
17.9 percent. Nigeria’s main import commodities in 2010 were machinery and transport 
equipment (ca. 50 percent), manufactured goods classified chiefly by material (21.1 percent) and 
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chemicals and related products (10.8 percent) (UN Comtrade, 2013). Trade is thus more 
diversified than in Sudan and South Sudan. 
UN Comtrade data which is available until 2010 helps to answer guiding question 4.b and 
4.c. Nigeria’s major trading partners are the US, India and Brazil. The EU member states 
Netherlands, France, Italy and Spain rank next as export partners. Overall, 80 percent of 
Nigeria’s export is divided between 12 main partners, while 16 major partners account for 
imports. China is not ranked in the top 10 trading partners of Nigeria until 2010 (ibid.). However, 
for imports in the year 2011, China is listed as one of the main partners with 17.3 percent, 
followed by the US (9.1 percent), India (5 percent), the Netherlands (4.9 percent) and South 
Korea (4.7 percent) (CIA, 2013). Alden (2008) observes how the total trade between Nigeria and 
China grew from 856 million US Dollar in the year 2000 up to over 2 billion US Dollar in the 
year 2004 ( p.110). This indicates that trade may develop in favor of China in comparison to the 
EU, but has not so far, in opposition to Sudan.
Regarding guiding questions 4.d. and 4.e., Nigeria is part of the ACP group and has 
acknowledged the main trade agreements with the EU, i.e. the Cotonou agreement. This includes
liberalization of its markets (European Commission, 2013). Progress in establishing a market 
based economy has been achieved by large-scale privatizations of oil companies in recent years. 
Still, non-tariff barriers are partly arbitrary and not in line with WTO principles (Federal 
Ministry, 2013). Nigeria won approvals from 2005 onwards of the informal group of creditors of 
the Paris Club, to restructure its debts and be partly relieved from it. In 2013 debts were fully 
repaid (Federal Ministry, 2013). The IMF acknowledges the government’s efforts to implement 
reforms in the market. Measures include the removal of subsidies, modernization of the banking 
system and settling regional disputes over oil revenues (CIA, 2013). 
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Thus, in Nigeria’s trade policy there are significant differences in comparison to Sudan 
and South Sudan. Nigerian-Chinese trade relations do not appear asymmetrical as in Sudan and 
South Sudan. According to UN Comtrade data, there is no strong turn towards China evident in 
Nigeria. In opposition to Sudan and South Sudan, Nigeria implemented many liberalization 
measures and seems to strive more for the EU, respectively Western model of development. EU 
member states have much more substantial trade relations with Nigeria than China does. 
However, trends especially in Nigeria’s increasing import and Chinese investments hint at a 
potential change in this regard.
5.2.4. Security Issues
In reference to guiding question 5.a., the security priorities of Nigeria differ from the ones of 
Sudan and South Sudan, considering that the overall security situation is more stable in most 
parts of the country. However, as mentioned, the oil industry in the Niger Delta is a continuous 
source of conflict. Local groups demand a share of the oil wealth and repeatedly attack the oil 
infrastructure and staff. Oil theft from pipelines, referred to as ‘bunkering’ is common. Relations 
between the International Oil Companies and local communities are affected by protest by the 
local population due to environmental damages from oil spills (US EIA, 2013). Furthermore, 
until 2013, the extremist Islamist movement Boko Haram was launching a series of high-profile 
attacks since President Jonathan’s inauguration in May 2011. The attacks were brutally counter 
surged by state security forces and lead to accusations of abuses, arbitrary mass arrests and 
killings. In 2012, strikes and mass protests against an announced increase in fuel-prices were 
violently crushed (Freedom House, 2013).
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Concerning guiding questions 5.b. and 5.c., in opposition to Sudan and South Sudan, 
Nigeria contributes to UN peacekeeping missions abroad and there are no international missions 
in the country itself. Nevertheless, Nigeria receives security support both from China and the 
EU. As mentioned earlier, a considerable part of the EU funding to Nigeria is intended to support 
the government in solving ongoing security issues. The EU refers particularly to the Niger Delta 
and the Northern part of the country (European Commission, 2013).
Referring to guiding question 5.d. and 5.e., as in the case of Sudan, South Sudan and 
many other countries, publicly available figures on weapon imports are incomplete in Nigeria. 
However, it is evident that Nigeria’s military expenditures have increased considerably in the last 
10 to 15 years (SIPRI, 2013, A). In 1998, they comprised only 688 million USD. In the 
following years military expenditures more than doubled, reaching a peak in the years 2010 
(with 2143 million USD) and 2012 (2386 million USD). These peaks are partly explained by two 
major weapon deals with China and the US. According to SIPRI (2013, B), China settled in 2010 
one major weapon deal with Nigeria, for the value of 156 million USD. This makes China the 
leading weapon exporter to Nigeria in the last decade. The EU member state Italy ranks second 
in this overall timeframe, with weapon supplies worth 97 million USD, followed by the US 
(exported for 70 million USD) and  Russia (67 million USD). It is argued that the Chinese 
willingness to sell arms to Nigeria for military action in the Niger Delta has secured mutual deals 
in the oil business (Alden, 2008, p.110). 
Thus, Nigeria has taken assistance both from China and the EU, as well as EU member 
states to respond to its security problems. Considering the critique of NGO’s on the harsh 
military crackdown by the Nigerian government, it seems that the EU’s normative stance is 
conflicting with the weapon supplies and the security funding. This confirms the common 
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critique of the EU being incoherent in its foreign policy towards African states, as found in the 
existing literature on the topic. 
Overall, the available numbers for Nigeria are not clearly comparable to the case of 
Sudan and South Sudan for the entire last decade. However, even with the incomplete data it is 
evident that Sudan’s military expenditures since the year 1998 outnumber the ones of Nigeria. 
Considering the security situation and the regime’s approach in Sudan, this not astonishing. 
However, with regard to the significant lower GDP of Sudan, the proportion spent on military 
expenditure is significant compared to Nigeria.
Moreover, as far as known, China’s arms exports to Sudan outnumber the arms sold to 
Nigeria. In both African states, China appears to be the top or certainly among the top weapon 
suppliers, with the seemingly exception of South Sudan. In the case of Sudan one can assume a 
security dependence on China. In the case of Nigeria, the security policy relations with China 
appear to be a convenient choice, taking into account the supposed link to oil industry 
investments by China.
5.2.5. Results of the Choices: Nigeria between China and the EU
Referring to guiding question section 6.a.- 6.c., this section will assess the overall development 
of Nigeria by the measures already applied to the first case. The HDI value of Nigeria improved 
from 2005 to 2012 from the value of 0.434 to 0.471. This means an overall increase of 9 percent
and an average yearly increase of about 1.2 percent. In the year 2012, Nigeria was ranked 153 
out of 187 countries and territories worldwide. All components of the HDI improved in 
approximately the last decade. Since 2000, Nigeria’s life expectancy increased from 46.3 years 
to 52.3, while it was rather stable around 45.5 years beforehand.  The expected years of 
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schooling increased in the same timeframe from 7.9 to 9 years. Likewise, the GNI per capita 
improved from 1,285 in the year 2000 to 2,102 in the year 2012 (Human Development, 2013). 
Accordingly, Nigeria is in the low human development group. In there, Nigeria (0.471) 
stands above are above the average (0.466). Compared to all Sub-Saharan African countries, 
Nigeria is below the average of 0.475. If one compares it to regional countries with a similar 
population size such as Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria is ranked 
higher in the HDI (ibid.).
Hence, both Sudan and Nigeria stayed in the low development group in the last decade. 
Yet, Nigeria developed better, while Sudan developed worse than the average. Since 2005, 
Nigeria’s HDI value increased by 9 percent cent while Sudan increased by 6 percent cent. It 
appears that measures that Nigeria’s leaders implemented with the partial help of the EU and 
China had a slightly better effect for the country’s population than in Sudan.
In the Freedom House Index, Nigeria is considered ‘partly free’ since 1999. It achieved 
the best freedom rating in the year 1999, when the overall freedom was rated 3.5, civil liberties 4 
and political rights 4. In the following years the three values slightly shifted between 4 and 5. In 
2013, Nigeria’s overall freedom is rated 4.5, civil liberties rated 5 and political rights 4. 
Generally, there has been progress towards more peaceful und free and fair nationwide elections 
since 2007 (Freedom House, 2013). 
However, according to Freedom House, Nigeria cannot be considered an electoral 
democracy. The ruling PDC relies on patronage networks of elites. Violence and pressure are 
commonly deliberately used by political elites to target opponents. For this aim politicians also 
support criminal gangs in the Niger Delta,. Although many freedom rights are guaranteed in the
constitution and broadly respected, there are repeated violation of freedom of expression, 
59
religion, movement and assembly. Many of violations are linked to pervasive corruption in the 
state and popular protests against it. Due to these suppressions, prognoses attest a downward 
trend in Nigeria’s freedom development (ibid.).
Thus, in comparison to Sudan and South Sudan, Nigeria’s standing in the freedom rating 
is considerably better. Despite disruptions during elections and downward trend, there has been 
improvement towards more democratization. Nevertheless, civil liberties in Nigeria have not 
substantially improved in the last decade. If one compares the timing before and after the two 
countries significantly enhanced their relationship to China, both Sudan’s and Nigeria’s overall 
freedom status have not substantially changed. Based on these two cases, one can assume that 
China has no direct influence on the freedom situation in both countries. At the same time, it is 
not evident that the development model of the EU with regard to democratization and human
rights has made a considerable difference in Sudan or Nigeria. This may be different in the case 
of South Sudan but it seems too early to judge. One cannot exclude the possibility that China or 
the EU contributed partly to maintaining the status quo, by supporting either of the governments. 
In the case of Sudan, it seems possible that the leaders may have found themselves forced 
to cooperate more with the EU and the West, if China had not offered economic and security 
cooperation. Depending on the willingness of Sudan’s regime, freedom rights could have been 
improved. 
Referring to the last guiding question 6.c., as mentioned earlier on, especially the Niger 
Delta is suffering severely from ecological damage. Oil production has arguably caused air, soil 
and water pollution; making land not arable and harming fish stocks (US EIA, 2013). As far as 
known, the scope of pollution is worse than in Sudan and South Sudan. Nevertheless, contrary to 
Sudan, the Nigerian leaders officially recognize the problem (Federal Ministry, 2013).
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All in all, in the case of Nigeria, one can assume that although relations between to China 
have significantly evolved on the level of diplomacy, economy and security in the last decade, 
this has so far not majorly affected economic dependence. It has neither significantly affected the 
human development or the civil liberties. The investments and weapon deals between Nigeria 
and China constitute reasons why Nigeria would opt for the Chinese model of development. 
However, in opposition to Sudan, Nigeria strives with regard to economic liberalization and 
democratization for the EU model of development.
A major difference to the case of Sudan and South Sudan is the range of options Nigeria 
has in search of international allies. While Sudan was internationally sanctioned, China 
constituted a unique trading partner and security ally. One could argue that in contrast to Sudan, 
the choice of Nigerian leaders to enhance relations with China was willingly made without such 
pressures. Since the security situation is more stable, Nigeria’s leaders did have to fear for their 
regime survival if they would fulfill Western, respectively EU conditions. Opting for the EU 
development model appears to be overall more beneficial for the Nigerian Leaders than for 
Sudan. At the same time, the fast and huge investments offered by China are also appealing to 
Nigeria. They are especially conforming to the development priority of diversifying the 
economy.   
6. Conclusion
This thesis investigated why some African leaders opt for the Chinese development model in 
opposition to the EU model and what the results of this choice are. In the research design, the 
reason for their choice and the results constituted the independent variable. To develop 
hypotheses about the independent variable, existing literature on the topic was evaluated, 
61
followed by the core concepts of the two development models. Also, the broader foreign policy 
triangle between Africa, China and the EU was considered. Accordingly, a set of guiding 
questions was developed compare the cases of firstly Sudan and South Sudan and secondly
Nigeria. These countries were investigated with regard to their diplomatic relations, 
development, trade and security policies and the respective relations to China and the EU.
In the case of Sudan and South Sudan it is evident that their leaders opted decisively for 
the Chinese development model which led to a very asymmetrical dependency on behalf of the 
two African states. This refers especially to huge Chinese investments in oil production, export 
to China and moreover to security issues, i.e. weapon supplies. However, South Sudan seems to 
develop more cooperation with the EU than the North. Sudan and South Sudan represent a 
deviant case due to their deep internal conflicts and their international isolation through Western 
embargos. The case suggests that opting for the Chinese model was vital for the Sudanese 
leaders in order to secure their authority. Revenues made possible by Chinese investments were 
vastly spent on military expenditures, for which China was a major supplier. The Sudanese 
regime stabilized itself through the acquired military means. Conversely, adhering to political 
conditions of the EU model, i.e. democratization, may have resulted in a loss of the leaders’ 
authority.
From a normative perspective, the results of these choices are regrettable since Sudan’s 
population has suffered considerably more than profited from the attempted stabilization of the 
regime. This is apparent in the unstable security situation, low human development, freedom
scores and environmental damages. Nevertheless, the EU development support has not entirely 
been rejected by Sudan and rather been welcomed by South Sudan’s leaders.
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The case of Nigeria suggests different hypotheses in comparison. For Nigerian leaders, 
major reasons to turn to the Chinese model seemed to be the fast and huge investments. They 
were primarily used for the leaders’ stated priorities of diversifying the economy and developing 
infrastructure. However, the overall course of Nigeria’s reforms seems directed towards the EU 
development model, which is evident though trade liberalization and democratization. For these 
aims, Nigeria co-operates with the EU. These commitments resulted in a comparatively stable 
economic and human development and better freedom rating than in Sudan and South Sudan. 
Both the primary reasons of stabilization of the regime and the priority of economic 
development confirm suggestions from the existing literature. Additionally, both cases imply that 
trilateral cooperation is possible, respectively that African leaders do not entirely reject one 
model in favor of the other. This means a chance for African states of to profit equally from the 
two models. Conversely, it implies an opportunity for both China and the EU to realize their 
interests.
To proof these developed hypotheses about the independent variable, data regarding the 
different policy areas would have to be completed and tested in more detail. This in fact difficult 
since not all required information is publicly available, i.e. regarding security issues. 
Additionally, to confirm and specify these hypotheses, further research should evaluate other 
cases. For example, certainly the case of Angola, as China’s major oil supplier in Africa, would 
be suitable to test the hypotheses more. 
Furthermore, the comparative case study also pointed out flaws in both the Chinese and 
the EU model of development. Supposedly, both are difficult to implement fully in African 
states. In the two cases, neither of the models has yet proven to be as successful as their concepts 
imply. One the one hand, Sudan and South Sudan did not develop exponential growth according 
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to the Chinese model. On the other hand, Nigeria has not developed as substantially as the EU 
model would suggest, regarding democratization positively correlated to economic growth
Finally, one has to consider that other actors such as the US and Russia maintain 
substantial relations to many African states. This is manifest in the fields of development aid, 
trade and security of both country cases. This factor should be taken into account in further 
research regarding why African leaders would opt for the Chinese model and with what results. 
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II. Annex
Guiding questions set
1. Broader goals: 
a. Is it evident that country’s X/Y leaders opted for the Chinese model?
b. Why did they eventually opt for the Chinese model? 
c. What are the results?
2. Specific aspects:
a. What regime type is case X/ Y? 
b. How did diplomatic relations develop with China – EU in the last decade?
3. Development: 
a. What are the development priorities of the leaders of country X/Y?
b. What does the development model offered by the EU/China include for country X/Y?
c. What kind of aid did X/Y receive?
d. Of which aid programs is it part?
e. Does it take concessional loans? 
f. Which investments has it received?
4. Trade Policy
a. What are the trade priorities of country X/Y?
b. How did import/export develop in the last decade? What are the main trading 
partners? Has the trade changed in favor of EU/China in the last years?
c. Of which trade agreements is country X/Y part? Has the country liberalized its 
markets?
d. Have the country received investments for trade agreements?
5. Security Policy
a. What are the security priorities of country X/Y?
b. Did international missions take place in country X/Y?
c. How were the EU or China involved in such missions?
d. What kind of military support has country X/Y received from the EU or China?
e. What arms sales have there been from the EU or China to country X/Y?
6. Results of opting for the Chinese model: 
a. How did the Human Development Index change in the last decade?
b. How did country X/Y develop in the Freedom House Index?
c. What are the environmental consequences of the option?
